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As a senior at Southern OregonUniversity it was my every inten-tion to enter the international
business arena. Nevertheless, I was in-
trigued by an announcement from the
placement center for positions within the
Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS),
and decided it was worth a practice inter-
view. The rest, as they say, is
history. Upon hiring, I initially
worked in the area of crimi-
nal investigations and
counter-narcotics operations
before my assignment to
counterintelligence in the
Philippines. Now, 16 years
after that practice interview, I
am the Deputy Assistant
Director for Counterintelli-
gence with the NCIS, an
organization that is 97 percent
civilian with 150 locations
around the world. Such is the
path that brought me to the
normally hectic schedule of
directing the global counterin-
telligence activities of the NCIS and the
Anti-Terrorist Alert Center (ATAC) on the
morning of September 11, 2001.
The impacts of the September 11
attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon were profound and irreversible
for the counterintelligence community and
NCIS. Due to the sudden compression of
time and the requirements for threat
analysis, the urgency of moving informa-
tion to the fleet and decision-makers, and
of coordinating global movements of
personnel, while still grappling with the
shock of friends and acquaintances lost,
was a monumental and emotional task. In
the hours that followed, the pressure for
information grew as people and other
organizations overcame the initial shock
and began to come online with an informa-
tion thirst that had no historic equivalent.
Initial surprise was quickly overcome by
resolve. The emphasis of the ATAC has
always been to move terrorism information
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quickly and directly to the Navy and
Marine Corps. The Navy’s emergency
terrorist message was launched within
minutes and the fleet was ready.
On a number of occasions over the
past year I have been asked for sensational
anecdotes of panic, confusion, or hysteria
within the command center that I directed.
Admittedly, there was a flurry of activity,
sorrow for the victims, concern for the
safety of family and friends, a real fear of
additional attacks, and a level of anger
percolating below the surface. All partici-
pants struggled with the desire to stay with
the job, be with their family, find those
who were lost, and the uncertainty of who
was next on the targeting list. The tenuous
control of emotions observed on the faces
of our co-workers stirred the resolve of
everyone, and ultimately moved many to
work multiple days without sleep. The
mission, the command center, and the work
became their focal point.
The exponential increase in appetite
for information was not new for the NCIS.
One year earlier the attack on the USS Cole
had caused a similar surge of activity.
Lessons learned from that tragic event had
already been inculcated into the task force
structure and information flow processes.
Speed of response was improved, com-
mand center requirements were known,
and directives were readily turned into
reality. The organizational machine was in
high gear within minutes after the World
Trade Center attacks.
What was the mission? Collect, ana-
lyze, and disseminate relevant threat
information to all elements of the Depart-
ment of the Navy, provide protection
where possible to those NCIS was respon-
sible for, support the overall national
efforts to quickly acquire information, and
prepare for the deluge of information
requests. There was also an underlying
recognition that we had just
entered a new era, still unde-
fined, which would change
how we thought and
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decision;makers and
coordinating global movements
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 while still
grappling with the shock of
friends and acquaintances lost
was a monumental and
emotional task
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responded, especially in the information
arena. Information as a business was
about to make an evolutionary leap.
To put context to today’s challenges, a
historic look back into the past of the
counterintelligence community gives some
insights into how far information capabili-
ties have evolved. In the 1980s, counterin-
telligence information sharing
was predominantly based on
interpersonal contacts across
organizational boundaries and
the dynamics of institutional
agreements. Information was
compiled into voluminous
documents of sometimes
grandiose size whose value
was jokingly determined by the
document’s weight rather than
content. Physical libraries of
these large volumes of texts
and studies, neatly stacked
and orderly, could be
found throughout the
counterintelligence community.
These products had been developed
over the course of time and with significant
expenditure of intellect. The approaches to
information development and use were
dominated by a plodding bureaucratic
methodology. Speed was not important and
production was based predominantly on
past needs and not current situations. These
gold mines of information were jealously
guarded by those who collected and
compiled the information. Ironically, access
to the information was not always impeded
by “need-to-know” for security purposes. In
reality, access was dominated by the “need-
to-know where to look” in a physical
building or room, or “need-to-know the
topic as filed.” Both of these were serious
impediments to the speed, use, and relevant
application of information.
The global information age that
followed began to automate the electronic
systems and caused a nationwide cultural
acceptance that information should be
more readily available. Information
availability slowly evolved, becoming
easier to transmit across organizational
boundaries, but was still impeded by
human relationships and/or institutional
arrogance and bureaucratic hoarding.
Notwithstanding a much more proficient
and automated capability, the user was still
hindered by the residual processes of the
past. The automated systems were just a
faster means to acquire information; the
customer was still required to know where
to look and forced to labor in the process
of “pulling” information.
This simplistic look at counterintelli-
gence information history reveals yet another
obstacle to be overcome. The movement
toward more accessible information was
impeded by the barriers of information
power. The “cliché” coin of the realm in the
1980s was “the holders of the most informa-
tion have the power.” Concurrent with the
information age of the 1990s, an effort at
fundamental change began in information
power bases. The new coin gradually
became “the speed of information transfer is
the power,” with integrity and relevance as
key components. Organizations in a hoard-
ing mode, making no efforts to push infor-
mation to the broader customer community,
began to find themselves bypassed by other,
more agile information competitors. The
monolithic institutions still retained signifi-
cant “hoards” of information, but with digital
analytical tools and faster movement of
information, their relevance began to
diminish as customers realized there were
other places to go for information.
The antiquated approach of large
products whose value was based upon size
was no longer as important as the speed
and impact of information. The ability of an
organization to compress the time lag from
the acquisition of information in the field,
through the analysis process, and the
ultimate transmission to a customer became
the currency of value within the counterin-
telligence community.
Few organizations within the U.S.
government have the multiplicity of mis-
… access to the information was
not always impeded by
“need;to;know” for security
purposes In reality access was
dominated by the “need;to;know
where to look” …
or “need;to;know
the topic as filed”
 15
sions uniting law enforcement, counterin-
telligence, military, and security into one
compact capability. NCIS developed and
launched a strategy to exploit this unique
capability. NCIS began to combine these
disparate professions and their respective
information sources to better frame the
threat and to provide a unique service that
many traditional counterintelligence and
intelligence organizations could not
emulate. NCIS also went on a campaign to
place personnel within the various cus-
tomer organizations to more readily
understand their needs and better craft
future products. Internal shifts in priorities
and directed counterintelligence activities
were made to match the new customer
needs that surfaced during the customer
integration effort. The integration effort
showed dramatic differences in each
customer’s priorities and interests. This
resulted in an information priority shift
from the “cold war” one-size-fits-all
product to the customizing of products to
each customer’s needs. Standardized
approaches gave way to a continual
remixing of counterintelligence and law
enforcement methodologies creating a
somewhat amorphous approach to the
new world problems.
Due to the global nature of the Depart-
ment of the Navy and the complexity of an
extremely mobile force, the “pulling” of
information was deemed inadequate to the
organizational needs of the Department. This
problem set was acknowledged by the
counterintelligence community and the
aforementioned integration effort provided
great insights into addressing this problem.
Business marketing thought was interwoven
into the age-old standard military require-
ments process. NCIS became more cognizant
of customer routines and timetables for
decision-making processes, and began a
transition to identify means whereby infor-
mation could be “pushed“ to the customer,
on time, and in a more usable form. This
simple concept of “push, not pull” is at the
forefront of all modernization efforts by the
counterintelligence community and NCIS.
Post USS Cole, the U.S. counterintelli-
gence community initiated a number of
incremental steps to change information
use and distribution channels. The attacks
on September 11 took those ongoing
efforts and compressed them into a six-
month revolution of change. The genetic
makeup of the counterintelli-
gence community will never
be the same and has forced
new information-sharing
initiatives that didn’t exist in
the past. Parochial informa-
tion boundaries are crum-
bling, and new systems and
analytical tools are displacing
the traditional library and
historical filing processes.
These are taking the form of
“piles of digital data” used by multiple
consumers with diverse needs. Each
consumer can produce products based
upon various needs not necessarily linked
to the original requirement for the data.
The competitive counterintelligence
bureaucracies that entered the 21st century
are now seeking ways to support and assist
each other. Competition is giving way to a
“coalition” between law enforcement,
counterintelligence, military, and intelli-
gence organizations. Technology is paving
the way for information sharing that is not
based solely on interpersonal relationships.
Rather than creating redundant systems
that would facilitate the “hoarding of data”
in the traditional sense, these previous
competitors are seeking to exploit each
organization’s strengths and work closer to
shore up the weaknesses. Institutional
efforts to control the entire global counter-
intelligence market are giving way to
organizations seeking ways to identify their
own specific “market” niches, and through
automated collaborative systems provide
information to the larger coalition.
Another element of change is in the
analysis of information by professions and
outlooks previously deemed to be only
V o l  -  N o  .   •   W I N T E R  1 2 2 1
This simple concept of “push
not pull” is at the forefront
of all modernization efforts
by the counterintelligence
community and NCIS
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supporting roles. Counterintelligence
organizations are seeking personnel
outside of the traditional law enforcement
and military professions that have fed the
counterintelligence community. Those
institutions that are able to hire across a
diverse professional backdrop are quickly
learning that diversity of
backgrounds and perspec-
tives are sometimes as
much a key to analytical
success as the primary
information collected.
The critical nature of
intelligence analysts and
librarian functions cannot be
overstated during this new
era. The compilation of
information, combined with
ensuring appropriate infor-
mation flow, data store-
houses, and pipelines for dissemination are
crucial to organizational viability. Almost any
organization can acquire data through field
activities. It is through the analytical process
that raw data becomes usable information.
NCIS and the counterintelligence community
are aggressively increasing the number of
information specialists at the cost of more
traditional assets, thus ensuring that the heart
of the organization remains strong and
viable. The transmission of data from the
field to the analyst and hence from NCIS to
the customer can be almost instantaneous. It
is the ability to filter information through an
informed knowledgeable cadre of analysts
that impacts on speed. Information reaching
a customer after a terrorist attack occurs
defeats the entire mission of the organiza-
tion. In the never-ending effort to provide
relevant and timely information to the
customer, it is critical that sufficient re-
sources, systems, and manpower are applied
to this phase of the process.
Notwithstanding the positives, change
does not come without stress. One impact
on this new information sharing revolution is
a breakdown of the past incentive structure.
Who gets the credit for stopping the next
terrorist attack? The mutual reliance on each
other results in spreading the credit and
making exclusivity difficult. This is further
exacerbated as each organization seeks to
retain identity, while supporting the coalition
and balancing customer requirements.
NCIS is currently in the middle of the
ongoing effort to create an environment in
the counterintelligence community that
facilitates daily communication among the
organizations. This is necessary to meet the
challenges presented by global situations
that are constantly changing. NCIS is
drawing on our nation’s diverse culture to
enhance our abilities to protect. The use of
diverse ideas is also the antithesis to the
narrow focus and single-mindedness of
terror. Our universities, institutions, govern-
ment, and for my part, the counterintelli-
gence community must retain this ability to
evolve if we are to succeed against hostile
entities. It is incumbent upon those manag-
ing these efforts to ensure progress, while
maintaining diligent oversight and balance
in the protection of individual rights, as we
strive to ensure our nation’s security.
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NCIS is drawing on our nation’s
diverse culture to enhance our
abilities to protect The use of
diverse ideas is also the
antithesis to the narrow focus
and single;mindedness of terror
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